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Abstract 
 
Wireless body area network(WBAN) is becoming 
more popular in recent years. Security and privacy of 
this network is the major concern for the researchers. 
Most of the WBAN sensors currently available in the 
market uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol for 
connection. But the BLE protocol has an inherent 
security flaw due to its weak pairing protocol which can 
be easily be exploited by an attacker. In this paper, a 
different pairing protocol based on Lightweight 
Anonymous Authentication Protocol (LWAA) is 
proposed. Proposed protocol has a 3.8% power 
overhead over traditional BLE. But this is a very small 
price to pay if we consider all the benefits it brings to 
the system.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is currently a hot 
research topic. WSNs are being used in more and more 
fields every day. Among these fields, one of the most 
important and critical fields is medical and health-care 
field. The life expectancy of an average person is 
increasing due to the medical advancement, 
improvement in nourishment and professional 
monitoring. Due to the proper monitoring and taking 
timely measures, health-care providers can take many 
preventive measures rather than doing treatment after 
any significant health issue occur. Many health 
monitoring systems like blood-pressure sensor, heart-
rate monitoring sensor, body temperature sensor, ECG 
monitoring sensor, EEG sensor, movement and fitness 
activity sensor are already in use for a while. These 
sensors can be wearable on the body surface or 
implanted inside of the body. Collection of the sensed 
and measured data is most commonly done using some 
wireless network. But traditional and conventional 
wireless links and methods are not suitable for these 
small devices because of extreme resource constraints, 
mainly low battery life and low computational power. 
The network for these resource-constrained sensors 
which might or might not be inside of a human body are 
commonly called Wireless Body Area Networks 
(WBAN). As most other wireless networks, security and 
privacy is a burning issue here. There should be some 
kind of mechanism through which the attacker can be 
prevented from getting the information from the 
network or manipulate the data available in the network. 
In simple words, data confidentiality, integrity and user 
authentication should be ensured in this network. 
Moreover, maintaining the user anonymity is becoming 
almost an essential feature in current days. As the 
network and the devices are resource constrained, 
conventional measures cannot be taken to ensure data 
confidentiality and integrity. There are few security and 
privacy solutions available for WBAN architecture. 
Among them, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is the most 
commonly used for WBANs. But there is a severe 
vulnerability in the pairing protocol of BLE. How this 
issue can be addressed, will be explored in this paper.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
The Idea of WBAN was first proposed by 
Zimmerman way back in 1996 [1]. But recently, due to 
the integration with the Internet of Things (IoT), WBAN 
has again become a hot topic for research as well as for 
the industry. WBAN is constructed with some resource-
constrained sensors, which are placed on or inside of 
different parts of a human body. The measurements 
form these sensors can be monitored remotely. WBANs 
are most commonly used in the healthcare system. They 
provide a more accurate data about the patient to the 
healthcare provider because the data collected are from 
the normal activities in the natural environment of the 
patient, not from a controlled environment.  
Sensors used in the health-care system can roughly 
be divided into two types- sensors which monitor vital 
status and sensors which are used for healthcare 
surveillance [2]. The vital status monitoring includes 
patient’s status monitoring inside a hospital, detection 
of epilepsy seizure etc. which requires immediate 
attention. On the other hand, healthcare surveillance can 
include elderly monitoring, temperature monitoring, 
ECG monitoring, EEG monitoring, which can be used 
to observe the long-term condition of a patient and 
might not need immediate attention.   
The WBAN should be able to guarantee the 
followings stringent security and privacy requirements– 
security, data integrity and most importantly, 
confidentiality of the user’s health record all the time 
[3]. The data sensed by the body network is very 
sensitive in respect to two aspects. Firstly, the data will 
shape the future diagnosis of the patient. Secondly, the 
privacy is an extremely important issue for patient’s 
medical data due to the American Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
Sometimes, WBANs are also expected to provide data 
freshness, availability of the network, secure 
management, dependability, secure localization, 
accountability, flexibility and support privacy rules and 
compliance requirement [4]. 
Ensuring security of a sensor network is extremely 
important. In the worst case, a security breach can lead 
to the death of a patient [5] if the sensors are controlling 
some vital medical instruments like heart pace-maker or 
lungs ventilator. On the other hand, a business executive 
wearing a heart-rate or ECG monitoring sensor is 
practically transmitting a signal of a lie-detector. If the 
rival party can get hold of this signal, it can easily be 
used as an unfair advantage against that executive. 
There are many kinds of attacks that can happen to a 
WBAN apart from just trying to get an unauthorized 
access to the network. This includes jamming the 
wireless channel, physical tampering of the sensor, 
denial of service (DoS) [6], side channel attack, sinkhole 
attack, Sybil attack, wormhole attack etc. 
A general architecture of WBAN centric healthcare 
system is consists of 3-Tier communication design [7] 
as shown in Figure 1. The 3-Tiers are intra-WBAN 
communication, inter-WBAN communication and 
finally, beyond-WBAN communication. Most of the 
research seen in the literature is seen to be limited in one 
of these three tiers. Different security aspects are 
required for each Tier. In this research proposal, only 
the Tier-1 portion of the WBAN architecture will be 
explored.  Intra-WBAN communication is normally 
limited within 2 meters of a human body.  Intra-WBAN 
communication can be further divided into 2 types- 
sensor-to-sensor communication, sensor-to-portable 
station (sink) communication. But in most of the 
literature, it is seen that the sensors in a WBAN 
communicate directly with the sink in a star topology, 
having the sink at the center of the star.  
There are few wireless standards available for WSNs 
[8]. Wireless LAN (IEEE 802.11- WLAN) is the well-
defined and accepted standard for home and office WiFi 
wireless network. Then there is IEEE 802.15.1 standard 
which is known as the Bluetooth protocol. It has three 
class of operation with a range of 100 meters, 10 meters 
and 1 meter respectively. But in a resource-constrained 
environment, it becomes impractical to use these 
standards as it is. Then came another standard namely 
IEEE 803.15.4, tailored for very low power wireless 
devices. It is also known as ZigBee. To standardize the 
WBAN communication, in 2007, Task group 6, which 
is also known as IEEE 802.15.6 was formed. It defines 
a Medium Access Control (MAC) which supports 
different Physical layers [9]. It offers 3 levels of 
security: unsecured communications, authentication 
only and finally authentication and encryption. There 
are also few other solutions available in literature-  
IrDA, NFC, ANT etc. In the following sections different 
available protocols for WBAN will be discussed briefly.  
 Figure 1.  A three-tier architecture based on a BAN communications system [7] 
3. Threat model 
 
For this paper, the following 3 threat/attack on the 
network has been considered: 
i) Eavesdropper: They can try to eavesdrop on 
the wireless signals transmitted by the user’s device. 
ii) Man-in-the-middle(MITM): Here the attacker 
secretly relays or try to alters the communication 
between two parties, creating an illusion to the parties 
that they are talking with each other. 
iii) Surveillor: They will try to identify the user by 
listening to his/her device and try to correlate with 
previously captured data.    
 
4. WBAN communication protocols 
 
In this section, few of the possible communication 
protocols those are currently in existence are discussed.  
 
4.1. Bluetooth low energy (BLE) 
 
One of the recently developed standard Bluetooth 
Low Energy (BLE) [10] has many lucrative features that 
can be utilized for WBANs. BLE is developed for short-
range applications and consumes very low power. BLE 
is a wireless communication protocol adopted in many 
fields of our daily life. Applications of BLE are ranging 
from fitness, healthcare, entertainment to home security 
and many more. It is used in most of the currently 
developed wearable devices available in the market. It 
is a modified version of the traditional Bluetooth 
protocol. It uses the same 2.4 GHz wireless band radio 
frequencies spectrum as traditional Bluetooth. But BLE 
has 40 channels with 2 MHz channel spacing. 
Contrasting to the traditional Bluetooth’s (Bluetooth 
BR/EDR) ability to connect with a maximum of 7 
different connections, BLE can theoretically connect to 
an unlimited number of devices. Typical range of 
operation of BLE is within 50 meters and maximum 
transmission power is 10mW.  
BLE has a stack layer Generic Access Profile (GAP) 
which decides the topology of the network. The device 
which initiates the connection process, normally act as 
the GAP central. Once two devices are connected, they 
will initiate a paring process where they exchange 
information to establish an encrypted connection. 
BLE introduces many security and privacy issues in 
the network. The main security issues involved with the 
BLE protocol are man in the middle (MITM) attack, 
eavesdropping, and identity tracking. BLE already has 
support for 128-bit AES encryption with Counter Mode 
CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) to ensure the confidentiality 
and integrity of the data. BLE uses small data frames of 
31 Bytes as shown in Figure 2, which makes any 
asymmetric encryption very hard and inefficient. But 
the main weakness of the BLE is the pairing stage. It has 
been demonstrated in the literature [11] that the entire 
security of the BLE network can be compromised by 
listening or overhearing only the connection 
establishment phase and capturing the required keys. 
The attacker only needs at maximum 20 pairing 
attempts captured to successfully break into the system. 
From every failed attempt, the attacker will get an 
incremental feedback of the security codes.  
       
4.2. CryptoCop 
 
To address the pairing and key exchange issue of the 
BLE, in 2016 a new protocol is proposed namely 
CryptoCoP [12]. In this protocol, the authors proposed 
that the key negotiation over the wireless channel is not 
required at all. They proposed the model for wearable 
devices only. As the wearable devices are needed to be 
charged periodically through cables, the authors 
envisioned that the keys can be exchanged during that 
time. By implementing the CryptoCoP, devices can get 
rid of the computationally expensive asymmetric 
encryption altogether. This helps in reduction of 
computational cost as well as radio transmission cost as 
there is no need for sending the long asymmetric key of 
1024 bits or 2048 bits through the wireless. To ensure 
the data confidentiality in CryptoCoP, AES is used in 
Counter (CTR) mode. To make the system self-
synchronized, an updated counter value is sent with the 
header. To ensure a second layer of security, keys are 
periodically rotated. To maintain the anonymity, 
CryptoCoP introduces a mechanism to be anonymous to 
a Surveillor, but still be able to pair-up with previously 
connected devices (i.e. sink). But one of the major 
disadvantages of CryptoCoP is that it will not work for 
implanted sensor inside of the human body at all as there 
is no way to connect cable to those sensors.  
 
4.3. LIRA 
 
A different protocol named LIRA [13] has been 
proposed with a different way to address the key 
exchange for the wearable body sensors. LIRA stands 
for light channel for sensor initialization and radio 
 Figure 2.  Bluetooth low energy Data Packet [10] 
channel for authentication. In that paper, the authors 
proposed to use a separate light source unit to transmits 
secret keys over a protected visible light channel to the 
body control unit which is essentially the sink. The 
major disadvantage of this architecture is that it requires 
clear line-of-sight (LoS) between the sensor and the sink 
to work properly which might not be practical for 
wearable sensors, and impossible for implanted sensors.  
 
4.4. ZigBee 
 
Zigbee [14] is an IEEE 802.15.4-based specification 
for a high-level communication protocol which is used 
to create small, low-power network. It is currently being 
used mainly for home monitoring devices and medical 
devices. The design goal for ZigBee is to establish low-
power, low data rate, and close proximity ad hoc 
network. 
Zigbee has the ability to deliver low-latency 
communication. To reduce the device cost, Zigbee chips 
are often integrated with microcontrollers and radios. 
Similar to BLE, ZigBee also operates at 2.4GHz band. 
It also supports few other frequency bands within the 
range of 700-900MHz. Data rate supported by ZigBee 
varies from 20kbps to 250kbps. ZigBee is built on the 
top of IEEE 802.15.4. It adapts the Physical and Link 
layers from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. ZigBee uses 3 
types of keys for the security purpose- link key, network 
key, and master key. But compared to the BLE protocol, 
the overhead for the ZigBee network is much higher and 
hence the power consumption is also high. This is due 
to the fact that the packet size for ZigBee is much higher 
than the BLE. In ZigBee, devices can work in two 
different mode to reduce the power consumption- full 
function device (FFD) and reduced function device 
(RFD). 
There is another enhanced version of ZigBee came 
out in 2007 which is marketed as ZigBee Pro.  
 
5. Proposed solution 
 
In this section, a solution is proposed to alleviate the 
security problem associated with the pairing mechanism 
of the BLE protocol.  
Figure 3. Lightweight anonymous authentication protocol 
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5.1. Assumptions 
 
While proposing the alternate solution for the BLE 
pairing protocol, the following assumption were 
considered: 
 
i) The wireless channel between the sensor and 
the sink is reliable. 
ii) The sink is not a resource constrained device. 
iii) Devices only have the ability to communicate 
with the sink. No inter-sensor communication is 
possible. 
iv) Sensors always have enough data available to 
periodically send them to the sink. 
V) Sensors are at a same distance from the sink. 
The transmitting power of every antenna is equal. 
 
  5.2. Lightweight anonymous authentication 
protocol  
 
Instead of the prescribed pairing mechanism of the 
BLE protocol, in this paper we propose to use the 
Lightweight Anonymous Authentication Protocol [15] 
as the pairing and the key exchange mechanism. In [15], 
the authors proposed to use the Lightweight 
Anonymous Authentication (LWAA) protocol for the 
connection between the server and the sink. But in this 
paper, the LWAA protocol is proposed to be used for 
the connection between the sensor and the sink. There 
are two different connection phases of this protocol. The 
first phase is called the registration phase. For this 
phase, a secured channel is required and it is required to 
be done only once. It is envisioned that, it can be done 
before implementing the sensors on/inside the human 
body in a secure location. In the registration phase, 
sensor sends its identity number IDL to the sink through 
the secured channel. When the sink receives the IDL, it 
calculates Kls= h(IDL|| Ns) ⊕ IDL, where Ns is a random 
number generated by the sink, and h(.) is a hash 
function. The length of all the numbers and the output 
of the hash function, all are considered to have a length 
of 128bits each. After validating the sensor for the first 
and only time through IDL, the sink sends Kls, shadow 
ID, emergency key Kem and the hash function h(.) to the 
sensor.  
The second phase is considered as the main 
lightweight anonymous authentication protocol. The 
entire process is shown in Figure 3. All the acronyms 
used in this paper are described in Table 1. In brief, the 
sensor sends a message MA1: {AIDL, Nx, TrSeq, EL, V1} 
to the sink. After validating the MA1 message, the sink 
sends back another message MA2: {Tr, V2, x} to the 
sensor. The sensor and the sink authenticate each other 
by MA2 and MA1 respectively.  Finally, the KlsNew which 
is generated by the sink, will be used by the sensor as 
the encryption key for AES.   
 
5.3. Simulation  
 
The LWAA protocol was implemented in 
MATLAB to check whether the protocol works as 
described in [15] or not. A partial simulation of the 
network was done only consisting of the anonymous 
authentication process to find the computational and 
communication overhead of the LWAA protocol. This 
was done to do a comparative analysis of the proposed 
method with some already existing protocols, namely- 
traditional BLE, CryptoCoP, and ZigBee. To measure 
the power consumption of an individual sensor, it is 
Table 1. Acronyms with definition  
Symbol         Definition 
IDL Identity of the sensor 
AIDL One-time alias identity of sensor 
SID Shadow identity of the sensor 
Kls Shared key between the sensor & sink 
KlsNew New shared key between the sensor & sink 
Kem Shared emergency key between the sensor & sink
TrSeq Track sequence number 
Tr New track sequence number 
LAI Location area identifier 
h(.) One-way hash function 
 Figure 4.  Power consumption for different protocol 
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assumed that, every sensor has to send 3 packet worth 
of information to the sink in every 5-second interval and 
go to sleep mode. After waking up from the sleep stage, 
sensors need to pair up with the sink every time. 
Computation cost per-cycle is considered to be 0.00354 
ߤJ according to [16]. To have a fair comparison between 
the protocols, for ZigBee, transmission (Tx) and receive 
(Rx) power for only 2.4GHz band was considered as all 
other also work in that same band. Per-bit Tx/Rx power 
consumptions for all the protocols were adapted from 
[17].  As all the discussed protocols use AES-128 for 
encryption, the same cost of 38	ߤJ/block for encryption 
is considered for all of their power consumption 
according to [16]. The detail calculation of power 
consumption is shown in Table 2.  
 
5.4. Results and analysis  
 
The comparative results between different 
protocols are shown in Figure 4. The same result is 
translated into the sensor lifetime in Figure 5. The 
battery power for all sensors is assumed to be 1000mAh. 
From the Figure 4 and Figure 5, it is seen the 
performance of CryptoCoP is the best considered the 
power consumption or sensor life. But as discussed in 
Section 4.2, this method is not suitable for all kind of 
WBANs- precisely implanted sensor devices. Next best 
performing protocol is found to be conventional BLE. 
But this protocol also comes with its disadvantages as 
described in Section 4.1. ZigBee performs worst among 
the four compared protocols here as the communication 
overhead of ZigBee protocol is the highest.  
The main observation from the results is that, the 
proposed protocol (BLE with LWAA) performs 
comparable to the traditional BLE, only having a 3.8% 
increase in power overhead. But this small increase in 
power consumption should not pose any real problem as 
it comes with the added features like- mutual 
authentication, anonymity, secure key exchange etc. 
Proposed protocol has minimal effect on battery life.    
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a new pairing protocol is proposed for 
BLE protocol for WBAN networks. By implementing 
Lightweight Anonymous Authentication (LWAA) 
protocol over BLE, the vulnerability of the traditional 
BLE protocol’s pairing can be alleviated and few added 
advantages like mutual authentication, anonymity can 
be achieved. The proposed protocol only adds about 
3.8% power overhead over the conventional BLE 
protocol.  
This number might be affected if there is some 
change in some of the assumptions considered in this 
paper. For example, it is considered that the wireless 
channel between the sensor and sink is very reliable, 
which might not always be true. If the channel is not 
reliable, the overhead number will certainly increase. 
Another assumption considered here is that all the 
sensors have always readily available data for sending 
to the sink, which also, might not always be true. The 
effect of these variations can be explored in the future.  
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